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Many studies have shown that behavioral measures are affected by manipulating the
imageability of words. Though imageability is usually measured by human judgment, little
is known about what factors underlie those judgments. We demonstrate that imageability
judgments can be largely or entirely accounted for by two computable measures that
have previously been associated with imageability, the size and density of a word’s
context and the emotional associations of the word. We outline an algorithmic method
for predicting imageability judgments using co-occurrence distances in a large corpus.
Our computed judgments account for 58% of the variance in a set of nearly two thousand
imageability judgments, for words that span the entire range of imageability. The two
factors account for 43% of the variance in lexical decision reaction times (LDRTs) that
is attributable to imageability in a large database of 3697 LDRTs spanning the range of
imageability. We document variances in the distribution of our measures across the range
of imageability that suggest that they will account for more variance at the extremes,
from which most imageability-manipulating stimulus sets are drawn. The two predictors
account for 100% of the variance that is attributable to imageability in newly-collected
LDRTs using a previously-published stimulus set of 100 items. We argue that our model
of imageability is neurobiologically plausible by showing it is consistent with brain imaging
data. The evidence we present suggests that behavioral effects in the lexical decision
task that are usually attributed to the abstract/concrete distinction between words can be
wholly explained by objective characteristics of the word that are not directly related to the
semantic distinction. We provide computed imageability estimates for over 29,000 words.
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In the literature on word recognition and reading, imageability
refers to the extent to which a word evokes a tangible sensation, a
phenomenological effect that is traditionally measured by human
judgment. Our goal in this paper is to outline the factors that
contribute to imageability judgments. We review evidence sug-
gesting that human imageability judgments are correlated with
factors that have nothing to do with evoked sensation and demon-
strate that the variability in imageability judgments and in some
of their behavioral effects can be largely or entirely accounted for
by measurable features that do not directly reference evoked sen-
sation. The two features we focus on here are the density of the
contexts in which the word occurs and the emotional associations
of the word, with both measures derived from a co-occurrence
model of semantics. As we review below, both of these measures
have previously been associated with imageability. The unique
contribution in this paper is how we measure them. Our goal
is to show that when measured using objective formal meth-
ods (rather than subjective judgments), these measures account
for essentially all of the variance in imageability judgments and
their behavioral effects. Estimating imageability using algorithmic
methods grounded in empirical measures has the practical bene-
fit of allowing us to derive principled imageability estimates for
every word in the English language.
BACKGROUND
Researchers distinguish imageability from concreteness, the extent
to which a word’s referent is amenable to detection by the
senses and from other possibly related variables such as sensory
experience ratings (Juhasz et al., 2011) or body interaction rat-
ings (Paul et al., 2008). Although closely related, imageability
and concreteness can dissociate. For example, the word eternal
shows a large concreteness/imageability rating difference, with
a medium imageability rating from (Wilson, 1988) of 4.03/7
(z = −0.27) and a low concreteness rating (2.14/7; z = −1.61),
perhaps suggesting that judges have a tangible feeling about eter-
nity. However, usually imageability and concreteness are highly
correlated. Across the 1609 words for which we have both mea-
sures, they correlate at 0.64 [t(1607) = 33.9, p < 0.00001].
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Imageability differences have been shown to have many behav-
ioral effects, including effects on recall (e.g., Paivio, 1971, 1985,
1995; Hamilton and Rajaram, 2001) and lexical access (e.g.,
James, 1975; Strain et al., 1995; Westbury and Moroschan, 2009).
Children acquire imageable words earlier than non-imageable
words (Bloom, 2000). Many aphasic patients perform better
with imageable words than non-imageable words (e.g., Goodglass
et al., 1969; Coltheart et al., 1980), though the opposite pattern
has also been documented (e.g., Warrington, 1975; Warrington
and Shallice, 1984; Sirigu et al., 1991; Breedin et al., 1995;
Cipolotti and Warrington, 1995; Marshall et al., 1996; Papagno
et al., 2009). Accessing imageable vs. non-imageable words evokes
different brain activity (e.g., Friederici et al., 2000; Jessen et al.,
2000; Fiebach and Friederici, 2003; Noppeney and Price, 2004;
Binder et al., 2005).
The best-known theoretical account of imageability is Paivio’s
(1971, 1985) Dual-coding theory. Dual-coding theory suggests
that imageable words have an advantage over non-imageable
words because they are represented with two codes: a verbal
code that can be used to represent words at both extremes of
the imageability spectrum, and a non-verbal code that can be
used to represent imageable words that also have sensory-motor
information associated with them.
Another theoretical account, context availability theory
(Schwanenflugel and Shoben, 1983; Schwanenflugel and Stowe,
1989; Schwanenflugel, 1991), proposes that imageability effects
can be accounted for by a single system connecting words to
their network of associated semantic knowledge. Behavioral
differences in accessing words at either end of the continuum
reflect differences in the amount of information that helps to
link that semantic knowledge with each word. According to
Schwanenflugel (1991) “contextual information may come either
from the comprehender’s knowledge base or from the external
stimulus context” (p. 242). High imageable words have easy
access to prior knowledge and do not benefit from associated
contextual information for processing and comprehension.
Low imageable words depend to a much greater extent on that
contextual information. Context Availability Theory predicts
that behavioral effects of imageability should be strongest when
the words are presented in little or no context, and weaker when
a more explicit context is provided. This prediction has been
shown to be true (Schwanenflugel and Stowe, 1989).
These two accounts share an obvious and seemingly oblig-
atory feature: they define imageability in terms of semantics.
However, imageable words differ from non-imageable words in
many other ways than their meaning. Low imageability words
tend to occur less frequently than high imageability words. Across
the 3697 words considered in this paper, the logged orthographic
frequency of the word (from Shaoul and Westbury, 2010b) cor-
relates with imageability at 0.19 (p < 0.00001). Reilly and Kean
(2007) have documentedmany other non-semanticmeasures that
differ between high and low imageability words, including stress
patterns, number of letters, rate of consonant clustering, affix-
ation probability, and neighborhood density (see also Westbury
and Moroschan, 2009; Reilly et al., 2012).
The suggestion that imageability judgments reflect more than
just semantics is supported by systematic patterns of apparent
errors that can be seen in imageability judgments. Some words
(like eternal) have mid-range imageability ratings despite the
fact that they are not perceptible with our senses. Other exam-
ples of such words include heaven (imageability rating of 4.3/7,
z = −0.04), glory (imageability rating of 4.17/7, z = −0.16), and
grace (imageability rating of 4.1/7, z = −0.21). The classification
of these words as being of mid-imageability despite their indis-
putable non-perceptibility forces us to confront the possibility
that raters use other cues than just sensory perceptibility1.
Imageability judgment norms also include nouns that have
very specific concrete referents but are rated low on imageability.
For example, the word astrolabe is rated only 1.5/7 (z = −2.39)
on imageability, although astrolabes have a distinct physical
form that is dictated by their function, making them extremely
imageable. Other examples of apparently too-low ratings of
easily imageable nouns include bough (imageability rating: 2,
z = −1.97), stein (imageability rating: 2.1, z = −1.89), and aster
(imageability rating: 2.2, z = −1.80). Given that all of these words
refer to concrete objects, we assume these ratings are low only
because subjects did not know what the words’ referents were.
Imageability ratings appear to sometimes reflect concept familiar-
ity or ease of concept accessibility rather than imageability per se.
In this we treat judgments as dependent measures, decon-
structing the judgments into objective component features.
STUDY 1: MODELING IMAGEABILITY JUDGMENTS
Imageability judgments for 3813 words were compiled from four
sources: Bird et al. (2001); Cortese and Fugett (2004); Stadthagen-
Gonzalez and Davis (2006), and Wilson (1988), itself a compi-
lation from Paivio et al. (1968); Gilhooly and Logie (1980), and
Toglia and Battig (1978). Where we had multiple judgments, we
averaged them together, after normalizing them to a scale from
1 to 7. In total, 3697 of these words appeared in the dictionary
of our co-occurrence model (described below), so we used those
words. In order to be able to validate our conclusions on an inde-
pendent data set, we randomly split this dataset into two halves
containing about 1848 words each.
PREDICTOR SET 1: WORD CO-OCCURRENCE
Firth (1957) famously suggested, “You shall know a word by the
company it keeps.” The famous dictum is particularly applica-
ble to abstract words. Under the assumptions of both Dual Code
Theory and Context Availability Theory, concrete words can have
their meaning fixed in part by non-lexical semantics. A person
can learn about the referents of material words by interacting with
those things in the world. However, abstract words have no sen-
sory context. As Context Availability Theory proposes, abstract
words should therefore be more reliant on the linguistic contexts
in which they appear.
One problem with Context Availability Theory is that “con-
text” is a slippery word. There are many different ways to define
1It may also be that the religious nature of these particular examples has
exposed people either to imaginative pictorial representations of the concepts,
or caused them to ponder them deeply enough to feel they can almost sense
them (a point we will return to). If so, the examples still pose a problem for
our traditional understanding of what it means to be of “low imageability.”
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what a word’s context is, each of which may be appropriate for
some purposes and none of which clearly presents itself as best
for any particular purpose, let alone for all purposes.
In trying to formalize what we mean by “context,” we might
simply define a word’s context as the words that appear near
to that word in some large corpus. Co-occurrence models (e.g.,
Lund and Burgess, 1996; Landauer and Dumais, 1997; Burgess,
1998; Shaoul and Westbury, 2006, 2010a, 2011; Jones and
Mewhort, 2007; Rhode et al., 2007; Durda and Buchanan, 2008)
eschew this first-order context and use second-order co-occurrence
to define context. In co-occurrence models, words share a context
not if they occur together (first order co-occurrence), but if they
occur with similar words (second order co-occurrence). By look-
ing at their co-occurrence contexts, we might be able to conclude
that e.g., “semiotics” and “symbolism” had associated meanings
even if the two words never occurred in proximity to each other.
In this paper we begin with a measure of context computed
using the open-source model of word co-occurrence, HiDEx
(Shaoul and Westbury, 2006). HiDEx computes a standard
distance in co-occurrence space, the neighborhood membership
threshold, that is a function of the mean and standard devia-
tion of inter-word distances between billions of random word
pairs (for details, see Shaoul and Westbury, 2006, 2010a). This
threshold enables the definition of two measures of semantic
density. Average Radius of Co-Occurrence (ARC) is the mean dis-
tance between the target word and all words within its threshold.
Neighbor Count (NCOUNT) is the number of neighbor words
within that threshold. We use a transformation of NCOUNT
that we call Inverse Neighbor Count (INV-NCOUNT), defined as
1/(NCOUNT + 1), which correlates better with many behavioral
measures (including imageability judgments) than NCOUNT
itself does. We used the default parameter set shown in Table 1
(for justification, see Shaoul and Westbury, 2010a), comput-
ing co-occurrence measures from a corpus of approximately 12
billion words of USENET postings (Shaoul andWestbury, 2010c).
Both ARC (r = 0.18, p < 0.00001) and INV-NCOUNT
(r = −0.28, p < 0.00001) were reliably correlated with the
imageability ratings for the 1848 words in the test set. A linear
regression to predict the imageability ratings using only these
two measures entered both predictors reliably (Table 2), and
had an r2 value of 0.08 (p < 0.00001). This regression equation
performed equally well on the separate validation set (r2 = 0.08,
p < 0.00001).
We conclude from this initial analysis that, as suggested
by Context Availability Theory, formally-defined measures of
Table 1 | HiDEx parameter set for computing co-occurrence measures.
Corpus UseNet Corpus
Corpus size 12,714,502,395 words
Context size 10000 words
Window length behind 5 words
Window length ahead 5 words
Weighting scheme Inverse Ramp
Normalization method PPMI
Similarity metric Cosine
For more details, see Shaoul and Westbury, 2010a,b,c, 2011.
contextual density derived from co-occurrence models are highly
reliable predictors of imageability judgments.
PREDICTOR SET 2: EMOTIONAL VALENCE
Altarriba et al. (1999) and Kousta et al. (2011) (among oth-
ers) have presented evidence suggesting that affective infor-
mation (emotional association, which combines valence and
arousal judgments; see Footnote 3 in Kousta et al., 2011) is
more important for abstract than concrete concepts. Emotional
association in these studies has been measured with human
ratings. Here we developed an algorithmically well-defined mea-
sure of emotional association that relies only on co-occurrence
measures.
We began by taking 78 distinct terms that have been proposed
by different emotion theorists as “basic emotion terms.” These
terms are summarized in Table 3 and, in slightly more detail, in
Appendix 1. We then undertook a backwards regression using all
78 terms to predict the imageability judgments, removing at each
step the term that predicted least well.
Rather than stopping when all terms entered with p < 0.05, we
continued until only eight terms remained, all of which entered
into the regression with p < 1e-08. There were three reasons for
this. One is that the average number of terms in the models we
drew the terms from was eight. The second was that eight terms
is a tractable number for human beings to easily consider. The
third reason was that limiting the number of predictors to only the
most highly predictive limits the likelihood of over-fitting, since
we eliminate a lot of “detail” fitting with slightly contributing pre-
dictors. Stopping at p < 0.05 would have left us with 22 emotion
term predictors that accounted for about 6%more variance in the
test set, and about 3% less variance in the validation set than our
8-predictor set did.
The 8-predictor set is shown in Table 4. It included four
terms with positive weights associated with higher imageability—
horny, pleasure, proud, and from—and four with negative weights
associated with lower imageability—envious, admirable, arouse,
and good. These distances were very good predictors of the
1848 imageability judgments in the test set, with r2 = 0.31 (p <
0.00001). When the same regression equation was used to pre-
dict the 1849 imageability judgments in the validation set, it
performed almost exactly as well (r2 = 0.30, p < 0.00001), sug-
gesting that the equation was not over-fit to the test set.
Although it is an excellent predictor of imageability judgments
and validates well, the eight-emotion set has the disadvantage
that it does not admit of any obvious theoretical interpretation.
Table 2 | Regression model for predicting human imageability
judgments from two quantitative measures of context derived from
co-occurrence similarity measures, on the test data set consisting of
1848 items.
Estimate SE t-value p
Intercept 2.26 0.81 2.80 0.005
ARC 2.59 0.82 3.13 0.002
INV-NCOUNT −0.64 0.06 −9.93 <2e-16
Multiple R2: 0.08; AIC: 5670 F(2, 1845) = 83.29, p < 2.2e-16.
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Table 3 | The sources and names of all “basic emotion” terms considered.
Source Included terms
Ekman et al., 1969 Anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise
Ekman, 1999 Amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, happiness, interest,
pleasure, pride, relief, sadness, satisfaction, shame, surprise
Kassam et al., 2013 Anger, disgust, envy, fear, happiness, lust, sadness, shame
Osgood et al., 1957 Active, bad, good, passive, strong, weak
Panksepp, 1982 Care, fear, lust, panic, play, rage, seeking
Plutchik, 1980 Anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise
Reizenzein, 2009 Aversion, desire, disappointment, fear, happiness, hope, relief, surprise, unhappiness
Robinson et al., 2004 Approach, arouse, away, danger, evaluate, from, safe, to, toward, withdraw
Stevenson et al., 2007 Anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness
Tomkins, 1962, 1963: Mild terms Anger, contempt, distress, enjoyment, fear, interest, shame, surprise
Tomkins, 1962, 1963: Strong terms Anguish, disgust, excitement, humiliation, joy, rage, startle, terror
Wundt, 1896 Depression, excitement, pleasant, relaxation, tension, unpleasant
For more details, see the Appendix.
Table 4 | Regression model for predicting human imageability
judgments using co-occurrence distance from emotion terms, on the
test data set consisting of 1848 items.
Estimate SE t-value p
Intercept 4.34 0.18 23.56 <2e-16
Admirable −11.46 1.67 −6.87 8.96E-12
Arouse −14.84 1.54 −9.61 <2e-16
Envious −16.50 2.82 −5.85 5.87E-09
From 7.45 0.99 7.55 7.08E-14
Good −11.31 0.93 −12.11 <2e-16
Horny 19.42 2.41 8.05 1.44E-15
Pleasure 13.17 1.10 11.93 <2e-16
Proud 11.16 1.56 7.17 1.12E-12
Multiple R2: 0.31: AIC: 5161 F(8, 1839) = 102.4, p < 2.2e-16.
All but one of the emotion terms—envious—would normally be
considered positively valenced. The set includes distances from
the two closely-related (albeit not synonymous) terms horny and
arouse, with opposite weights. Although a theoretically-grounded
predictor set would be preferable, we note that our goal here is
mainly practical, to be able to predict imageability judgments
from well-defined objective measures.
Another concern about this model is that we began with such
a large pool of predictors. It is possible that any group of 78 words
might offer a rich enough set of possibilities to predict imageabil-
ity judgments. In order to see if this was true, we made up 10 sets
of 78 random words, drawn from all words of medium frequency
(between 10 and 500 occurrences per million) in the Shaoul and
Westbury (2010b) frequency norms. None of the 780 words was
also contained in the 78 emotion predictors or the 3813 words
for which we had imageability judgments. We repeated the same
backwards regression as above, to predict imageability judgments
on half the judged dataset beginning with each set of 78 terms and
continuing to remove predictors until just 8 of those 78 remained.
Table 5 | Correlation of regression model estimates with imageability
ratings, for ten models composed of eight words selected by
backwards regression from 78 random words, and one model
composed of eight words selected by backwards regression from 78
emotion terms, on both a development set of ratings and a separate
validity set.
SET TEST r VALIDATE r
1 0.57 0.60
2 0.58 0.57
3 0.63 0.71
4 0.58 0.57
5 0.57 0.59
6 0.59 0.61
7 0.58 0.54
8 0.58 0.60
9 0.58 0.57
10 0.57 0.58
EMOTION 0.55 0.55
We then validated the regression equation on the other half of the
judgment data.
The results are summarized in Table 5. Every one of the ten
randomly-defined sets produced eight items that were strongly
reliable predictors of the imageability judgments. This is perhaps
not surprising, given the large number of predictors we began
with. What is more surprising is that in every case the derived
regression equation was also a highly reliable predictor of the
validation set judgments, suggesting that the equations were not
simply over-fit to the test set. This result implies that it is possible
to reliably predict imageability judgments using selected words
from any set of 78 word co-occurrence similarities.
This is a rather remarkable conclusion, which compels us to
consider: what quality of a word both predicts imageability and is
sufficiently universal that any random set of a few dozen words
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covers its range? Unsurprisingly, we think the answer is: emo-
tional valence. To see if selected predictors were reflecting emotion
valence, we looked at the correlation between the 80 beta weights
from all ten random-word models, and the co-occurrence dis-
tance from the eight emotion terms in our best model, weighted
positive or negative according to their weight in that regression
model. As shown in Figure 1, these values are very highly cor-
related (r = 0.63, p < 1.0e-10) and the direction of sign on the
beta weights of the 80 random words in the ten models divides
the signed summed distance estimates into two distinct groups
(t(78) = 10.0, p < 9e-16; see overlay on Figure 1). This suggests
that the predictor words selected from the ten sets of random
words are serving as proxies for emotional valence.
Against this strict interpretation is that fact that some of the
random sets reliably outperformed the original set of eight emo-
tion terms in predicting imageability judgments, in both the test
and validation set. It seems odd to say that a proxy for a measure
should perform better as a predictor than the measure itself. The
performance of the random sets suggests that our prediction set
of eight emotion terms is sub-optimal for predicting imageabil-
ity, at least for this particular dataset of imageability judgments.
However, it has the virtue of being theoretically motivated and
comprehensible as a generalization of the performance of the ten
otherwise-unrelated random datasets, so we have continued to
include it in our model.
PREDICTOR SET 3: CONTEXT, EMOTIONAL VALENCE, AND LEXICAL
VARIABLES
When we added ARC, INVNCOUNT, LNFREQUENCY, word
length (LENGTH), and orthographic neighborhood size (ON) to
the eight-emotion model developed above, 10 of the 12 variables
contributed reliably (p < 0.05), with ON and distance from the
FIGURE 1 | Correlation between beta weights of 80 random word
predictors from ten regression models of imageability, graphed
against the sign-weighted summed co-occurrence similarity of each
random word to eight emotion terms. The overlain bar graph shows the
average [SE] sign-weighted summed co-occurrence similarity for random
word predictors that had negative or positive beta weights [t(78) = 10.0,
p < 9e-16].
word from dropping out (Table 6). This full model had r2 = 0.36
(p < 0.00001; AIC = 5032) on the test set and again transferred
very well to the validation dataset, with r2 = 0.36 (p < 0.00001).
This appears to be a robust model of imageability judgments.
One of the advantages of developing models of imageability
judgments based on non-subjective measures is that they can be
easily extended to new words, since the objective measures we
need to estimate the judgments are well-defined for all words.
We have used the regression equation derived above to compute
imageability judgments for 29018 English words, which we will
make available2 at: http://www.psych.ualberta.ca/~westburylab/.
The 50 words estimated to be highest and lowest in concrete-
ness are reproduced in Appendix 2. Although one might question
a few of the high imageability words (are “adventures,” the sec-
ond most imageable word, really more imageable than “fish,” the
34th most imageable word?), the lists generally cleave unambigu-
ously to the expected distinction between the sensible and the
non-sensible.
DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that a large proportion of the vari-
ance in imageability judgments can be accounted for with three
variable types: measures of co-occurrence density, measure of
co-occurrence similarity to emotion terms, and some lexical mea-
sures that were previously known to be correlated with imageabil-
ity judgments (word length and LNFREQUENCY).
We noted above that some words (citing eternal, grace, heaven,
and glory as examples) seemed to be rated “too highly,” with aver-
age imageability ratings despite their obvious non-imageability.
These words are also all estimated to be of mid or higher image-
ability using our regression equation, from −0.03z (for grace) to
2.0z (for heaven). The fact that we can replicate these “errors”
2Note that we have to exclude the eight emotion terms that actually appear
in the model, because their self-similarity of 1 gives them highly skewed
estimates.
Table 6 | Full regression model for predicting human imageability
judgments, on the test data set consisting of 1848 items.
Estimate SE t-value p
Intercept 3.25 0.72 4.51 7.00E-06
Admirable −14.72 1.51 −9.75 <2.0e-16
Arouse −12.83 1.42 −9.03 <2.0e-16
Envious −9.93 2.78 −3.57 3.64E-04
Good −9.00 0.82 −11.02 <2.0e-16
Horny 17.92 2.33 7.70 2.18E-14
Pleasure 11.49 1.08 10.65 <2.0e-16
Proud 7.47 1.55 4.84 1.44E-06
Arc 1.91 0.71 2.69 7.18E-03
Inv-ncount −0.32 0.06 −5.27 1.55e-07
Length 0.07 0.03 2.54 0.011123
Lnfrequency 0.12 0.02 7.10 1.78E-12
Multiple R2: 0.361: AIC: 5032 F(11, 1836) = 92.7, p < 2.2e-16.
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suggests that judges may be also using affective cues rather than
ontological knowledge to make their judgments.
Conversely, we had noted that several highly imageable
words—citing stein, bough, and aster—seemed to be rated too
low, close to −2z by subject ratings, and suggested that this
was due to subject ignorance. Our method, which has infor-
mation about how these words are actually used, correctly
rates these imageable words as of at least average image-
ability (between −0.13z for aster and 0.46z for bough). We
note that the average estimated imageability judgment across
all words was well on the imageable side of the 7-point
scale, at 4.3.
We have observed that there is a tendency for critics to assume
that a model that predicts imageability judgments with a corre-
lation of 0.60 (r2 = 0.36) accounts for just 36% of the variance
that those judgments account for. Of course this is not the
case since imageability judgments are themselves not perfectly
correlated with each other. A model of a dataset cannot pos-
sibly exceed the inherent reliability of that dataset. From the
sources listed above, we have at least two independent image-
ability judgments from independent sources for 1608 words.
These judgments are correlated at 0.81. Setting t-values equal
gives an equivalent correlation of 0.79 (r2 = 0.62) for 1849
items, the number of items in our test and validation sets. Our
model therefore accounts for about 36.5/62, or about 59% of the
variance that is accounted for by judgments from independent
sources.
We are ultimately not interested in the judgments themselves
so much as in how those judgments relate to behavioral measures.
In the next section we consider how well our model predicts such
behavioral measures.
STUDY 2: PREDICTING LEXICAL DECISION REACTIONS
TIMES
In this section, we demonstrate that the variance attributable
to EMOTIONALITY and CONTEXT derived above pre-
dicts the same variance in lexical decision reactions times
(LDRTs) as imageability does. We retrieved LDRTs for
our 3697 words from the English Lexicon Project (Balota
et al., 2007) and examined the ability of imageability to
account for variance in the residuals before and after tak-
ing into account EMOTIONALITY and CONTEXT. If the
predictors in our model account for the same variance as
IMAGEABILITY, entering those predictors should elimi-
nate the variability in the residuals that is attributable to
IMAGEABILITY.
Entering ON, LENGTH, and LNFREQUENCY alone
accounted for 29.1% of the variance in LDRTs in the full set of
3697 words. Using IMAGEABILITY to explain the remaining
variance (i.e., to explain variance in the residuals) accounted
for 6.1% of the variance in those residuals before removing
the variance attributable to CONTEXT and EMOTIONALITY
(p < 0.00001). After removing the variance in the residuals
that is attributable to CONTEXT and EMOTIONALITY (which
interacted reliably, p = 0.009), IMAGEABILITY accounted for
57% as much variance (3.5%), still a highly reliable amount
(p < 0.00001).
STUDY 2 DISCUSSION
Overall, the results above support the claim that the predictors in
our model are accounting for a large proportion of the variance
that is usually attributed to IMAGEABILITY.
STUDY 3: ANALYSIS OF WORD DISTRIBUTIONS
There is an additional facet to our claim that imageability judg-
ments can be explained by EMOTIONALITY and CONTEXT,
which is that the distributions of these two predictors are not uni-
form across the range of imageability. In this section we provide
the evidence to support this claim, and explain why it is impor-
tant for understanding any behavioral differences attributed to
IMAGEABILITY.
To illustrate the problem, we normalized the values of
EMOTIONALITY and CONTEXT (as defined by the regression
estimates of each dimension, considered above) and split themea-
sures into three groups along each dimension: high (>1z), low
(<1z) and medium (everything in between). The percent of high
and low imageability words that fall into each of the nine cate-
gories defied by crossing these two categories is shown in Figure 2,
which clearly shows how unevenly the words are distributed.
There are, for example, 80 times more high emotion/high con-
text words among the high imageability words (23.8% of all high
imageable words) than among low imageability words (0.30% of
all low imageable words). Conversely, there are 32 times as many
low emotion/low context words among low imageability words
(8.5% of all low imageable words) than among high imageabil-
ity words (0.27% of all words). Fully 95% of all high imageability
words fall into the mid or high range on both dimensions, vs. just
48% of all low imageability words.
Of course this means that when we divide our words up
into high and low imageability categories based on human judg-
ments, we are going to be sampling in unequal proportions from
the nine categories of high/mid/low CONTEXT × high/mid/low
EMOTIONALITY. If the average RT for each category is different,
the magnitude of these disproportions will have a strong effect on
imageability category RTs.
The average LDRTs for words in each of the nine CONTEXT×
EMOTIONALITY categories (after co-varying out the variance
attributable to LENGTH, ON, and LNFREQUENCY) are shown
in Figure 3. Words in the high/high category (i.e., the words
that are 80 times more common among high imageability than
low imageability words) have average (SE) estimated RTs of 642
(1.7)ms, while words in the low/low category (that are 32 times
more common among low imageable than high imageable words)
have average (SE) estimated RTs about 80ms slower, 723 (4.7)ms.
More generally (covering the entire spectrum of words) words
that are high on either context or emotionality (which make
up 67% of all high imageability words, but just 17% of all low
imageability words) are responded to over 50ms faster on aver-
age (647ms) than words that are not high on either dimension
(698ms), which make up 83% of low imageability words but just
33% of high imageability words.
This has an obvious result: when we select our words by
high/low human imageability judgment, we are making very
skewed selections across CONTEXT and EMOTIONALITY. If we
assume that there is no imageability effect at all (i.e., use the global
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FIGURE 2 | Distribution of high imageability words (top) and low
imageability words (bottom), by CONTEXT and EMOTIONALITY
category. “High” and “Low” categories along each dimension were
defined using a ±1 SD cut-off.
average RT in each CONTEXT × EMOTIONALITY subtype, col-
lapsed across all words), and simply draw words proportionally
to their observed frequency from among the high and low image-
ability groups (after co-varying out the variance attributable to
LENGTH, ON, and LNFREQUENCY), we would find that our
“high imageability group” had an average RT of 658ms, while our
low imageability group had an average RT of 680ms: that is, we
would find an “imageability effect” of 22ms that is founded on the
assumption that there is actually no difference in RTs attributable
to imageability per se.
This is approximately equal to the actual imageability effect in
this dataset. After again co-varying out the variance attributable
to LENGTH, ON, and LNFREQUENCY, the average (SE) RT for
all high imageability words is 657 (1.4)ms, vs. 682 (2.0)ms for
low imageability words, a difference of 25ms. Almost all (22/25
FIGURE 3 | Average English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007) LDRTs
for words in each of the nine CONTEXT × EMOTIONALITY categories,
after controlling for ON, LNFREQUENCY, and LENGTH. “High” and
“Low” categories were defined using a ±1 SD cut-off. Bars are SE.
or 88%) of the imageability effect is actually explicable by the two
predictors we are considering here.
We suspect that in most psychological experiments the effects
of CONTEXT and EMOTIONALITY will be much more extreme
than they are in this global analysis that includes medium image-
ability words, since experimentalists often tend to draw from
the extreme ends of their measures, where the disparities of
both proportion and RT are also at their extremes. For example,
the estimated RT difference between high emotion/high context
(“high imageability”) words and low emotion/low context words
(“low imageability”), again after controlling for the three lexical
variables, is 81ms.
To see if this was so in the real world, we collected data in a
lexical decision experiment using a previously published stimulus
set that we knew to be tightly controlled.
STUDY 3: LEXICAL DECISION
PARTICIPANTS
Our participants were 65 undergraduates (23 males; 42 females),
with an average (SD) age of 18.8 (1.6) years and an average (SD) of
13.6 (1.0) years of education. All reported themselves to be right-
handers with normal (or corrected-to-normal) vision who had
learned to speak English before the age of 6. They participated
in return for partial course credit as part of a subject pool at the
University of Alberta.
STIMULI
We used the stimulus set published in Binder et al. (2005), which
had been constructed (by Westbury) without any regard for emo-
tionality. That stimuli set was controlled using phonological data
and frequency counts from the CELEX lexical database (Baayen
et al., 1995). It consisted of 100 low to medium frequency nouns
(with an orthographic frequency between 2 and 170 per mil-
lion words) and 100 non-words, all from four to six letters in
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length. Half of the words had low imageability ratings (217–436
on a 700 point scale) and half had high imageability ratings
(range: 577–644). The imageability ratings of these words were
very strongly correlated with concreteness ratings at r = 0.94
(p < 0.0001). The concrete and abstract words were matched
to each other and to the non-words on letter length, phoneme
length, mean summed and minimal positional bigram frequency,
and orthographic neighborhood. The matching was done algo-
rithmically on an item-by-item basis so all matched pairs were
close on all of these dimensions simultaneously. Additionally, the
words were also matched item-by-item to each other on CELEX
orthographic frequency.
In the original 2005 paper that used these stimuli, we reported
a 33ms imageability effect, with average RTs of 740ms for the
high imageability word, and average RTs of 773ms for the low
imageability words (F(1, 23) = 15.72, p < 0.0001). Because of the
small number of participants and the fact that the original data
were collected in an fMRI scanner, we collected new data.
PROCEDURE
The experiment was a simple VLD experiment. Subjects were told
that they would see letter strings on the screen, and that their
task was to decide as quickly as possible whether the string was
a word (“c” key) or a non-word (NW) (“x” key). They were asked
to use the first and second fingers of their right hand to press the
response keys. The first two stimuli shown were practice stimuli
that were included only to accustom them to the paradigm and
that were never analyzed.
Data were collected using ACTUATE software (Westbury,
2007b) on Apple G4 Macintosh Minis connected to 17” LCD
monitors. Strings were presented on the screen in 60-point Times
font, in the middle of a white rectangle measuring 102 × 312 pix-
els, which was centered on the screen against a black background.
RESULTS
The average (SD) correct decision rate in the standard lexical
decision condition was 92.7% (4.7%). Two subjects were elimi-
nated for having percent correct scores more than 2.5 SDs below
the average (76% and 79%), leaving an average of 93.2% cor-
rect scores. All erroneous and NW responses were then removed
and discarded. Sixty-six responses (2.1%) were removed because
they were too quick, under 400ms. Nine responses (0.3%)
were removed for being too slow, over 4000ms. After exclud-
ing these responses, all remaining responses that were more
than 2.5z outside of the average of the remaining stimuli were
removed, eliminating an additional 89 responses (2.8%) for being
too slow.
The RT data were analyzed using generalized linear mixed-
effect regression models, fitted by Laplace approximation (see
Baayen, 2008). LENGTH, ON, LNFREQUENCY, CONTEXT,
EMOTIONALITY, and IMAGEABILITY were treated as fixed
effects. Subjects, stimulus order, and stimulus were treated as ran-
dom effects. Models were compared using Akaike Information
Criteria (AIC) values, which offers a principled criterion that
allows comparison of models on “goodness of fit” (minimiza-
tion of information loss in the model) while taking into account
the number of parameters. P-values were calculated using a
Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) random walk with 10000
simulations.
RESULTS
The average (SE) RT for correct responses to high imageability
words was 629 (12.3) ms, vs. an average (SE) RT of 684 (14.6)
ms for low imageability words, for an apparent imageability effect
(before controlling for any of the lexical variables, which were,
however, tightly matched between imageability categories in this
dataset) of 55ms [F(1, 124) = 8.3, p = 0.004].
We used linear mixed effects models to assess the effects
of the predictors. We began with a base model that included
ON, LENGTH, LNFREQUENCY and random effects of subject,
string, and stimulus order. Neither ON nor LENGTH contributed
reliably (p > 0.05, presumably because the stimuli set consisted
of uniformly short words), so they were dropped from the base
model. The resultant base model had an AIC value of 38712.
When EMOTIONALITY and CONTEXT were added to
this model, only EMOTIONALITY (which correlated with
IMAGEABILITY at r = 0.84 across all words in the experiment,
p < 0.00001) contributed reliably. The model with this predictor
added had an AIC value of 38700, suggesting that it was markedly
better than the base model (hundreds of times more likely to
minimize information loss).
With the contributions of these predictors fixed, we entered
IMAGEABILITY. It did not contribute reliably (t = −0.32, p =
0.75). As predicted, the two factors (or, in this case, just one
factor) we have considered in this paper accounted for all the
variance that had been attributed to IMAGEABILITY.
DISCUSSION
This result is entirely consistent with the analyses above,
which showed that IMAGEABILITY is largely predictable
from CONTEXT and EMOTIONALITY, that CONTEXT and
EMOTIONALITY categories are distributed disproportionally
among the high and low imageability words, and that the expected
RTs in the CONTEXT× EMOTIONALITY categories vary widely
and systematically across the range of those two predictors.
This result is also consistent with imaging evidence. In the
functional imaging study of lexical decision of abstract vs. con-
crete words that used the same stimulus set, Binder et al. (2005)
identified activity in left posterior prefrontal cortex (BA11)
as being strongly associated with low-imageability words. The
authors noted that this region had been linked with phonolog-
ical processes, verbal short-term memory, and lexical retrieval
(Démonet et al., 1992; Paulesu et al., 1993;Warburton et al., 1996;
Fiez et al., 1999) and interpreted the activation in those terms.
However, BA 11 has also been strongly linked to representing the
affective valence of a stimulus (Knutson et al., 2001; O’Doherty
et al., 2001), especially in ways that are sensitive to changes in
motivational context (Bechara et al., 2000; Rolls, 2000; Ochsner
and Feldman Barrett, 2001; for a review and discussion, see Ozier
and Westbury, 2013). The low-imageability word activity docu-
mented in the Binder et al. studymay therefore be also interpreted
as being consistent with a key proposition of this paper that words
in this class are being assessed in large part by having stronger
emotional associations than high imageability words.
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These neuroanatomical considerations lead us to speculate
that the rating task used to collect imageability norms may not be
executed in the way that the users of the task have always assumed.
When a participant is instructed to rate words according to the
extent which each “arouses a mental image, i.e., a mental picture
or sounds, or other sensory experience” (the instructions used
in Cortese and Fugett, 2004), it is normally assumed that they
attempt to mentally sense the word and then report how easy or
successful that attempt was. The ubiquitous, unconscious influ-
ence of our emotional system on cognitive processes leaves open
the possibility that the subject’s mind is also (perhaps implicitly)
considering a different question: “Do I really want to image that
word?” The rating that the participant provides might include an
emotional component so that introspective feeling of judging sen-
sibility reported is lower for words that are not desirable to sense
(e.g., blood) and higher for words that are desirable to sense (e.g.,
heaven).
This is consistent with work focused specifically on the role of
emotional valence in lexical access, which has found (except at the
highest levels of negative valence) a negative correlation between
emotional valence and RT: e.g., faster RTs formore pleasant words
(Kuchinke et al., 2005, 2007; Kanske and Kotz, 2007; Schacht and
Sommer, 2009; Silva et al., 2012). However, we note that image-
ability is correlated with many other lexical measures as well,
including concreteness, (discussed above) and action-relatedness
(Paul et al., 2008) and the presence of visual features (Hauk et al.,
2008). Precisely because they are so highly inter-correlated, it is
very difficult to adjudicate on the relative contribution of these
individual variables to RT or human judgments and the present
study cannot do so definitively.
CONCLUSION
We have taken two routes to trying to explain imageability. In
the first section of this paper, we reported success in predict-
ing the imageability with a single measure each of contextual
density and emotionality. In the second section, we verified
that our derived model of imageability accounted for most
or all of the variability in LDRTs attributed to human rat-
ings, both in a large database and in a replication of a previ-
ous experiment. We also showed how systematic differences in
the distribution of the components of our model underlie RT
differences.
The claim that LDRT effects attributed to imageability manip-
ulations can be explained by CONTEXT and EMOTIONALITY
does not of course nullify or cast any doubt upon the results of
previous experiments that have used IMAGEABILITY manipula-
tions: it rather contributes to explaining the effects obtained in
those experiments. Effects attributable to human judgments are
not altered or nullified because we offer an explanation in terms
of objective measures of what may underlie those human judg-
ments. However, the evidence does suggest that we need to be
cautious in attributing causal efficacy in lexical access to the con-
struct of imageability, per se. Effects attributed to the imageability
category, as determined by human judgments, can be largely or
wholly accounted for by using objective predictors that do not
include any measure of whether a word’s referent has features that
are accessible to the senses.
In closely related work (Westbury, 2013) we have recently
shown that a very simple model of emotion (based on co-
occurrence distances from just the six terms Wundt’s (1896)
model) can also account for all the variance that is usually
attributed to human judgments of subjective frequency (i.e.,
estimates derived from a co-occurrence model correlate with sub-
jective frequency judgments as well as independently-collected
subjective frequency judgments). This kind of unification of dis-
parate phenomena under the same explanatory framework is an
important piece of supporting evidence. The fact that two differ-
ent kinds of human lexical judgments (which are—as Westbury,
2013; Westbury, explicitly discusses—hardly correlated) can both
be explained using emotionality estimates gives us some confi-
dence that these measures may have explanatory efficacy.
In presenting this work, we have been asked if it is our inten-
tion to replace human imageability judgments with our own
measures. We have shown that our measures correlate strongly
with human imageability judgments; that they are as good as
human imageability judgments in the limited domain of predict-
ing LDRTs; that they have qualitative “face validity”; and that they
can be algorithmically extended to a large set of words. These
are all arguments in their favor. However, we of course do not
pretend to have solved the problem of grounding imageability
judgments definitively. The empirically-grounded predictors of
human imageability judgments we consider here are surely prox-
ies for affective information that might be better defined with
more neurobiologically relevant, more predictive, more widely
applicable, or more theoretically-enmeshed predictors that will
thereby be an improvement on ours.
Nothing in this paper should be taken to imply that there are
no semantic differences between imageable and non-imageable
words. However, we offer compelling reasons to doubt that the
behavioral differences attributed to imageability in the lexical
decision task have anything to do with those semantic differences.
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APPENDIX 1
SOURCES OF THE BASIC EMOTION TERMS
Wundt’s (1896) proposed that emotion consisted of three
basic axes: one for evaluation (“pleasant/unpleasant”), one for
arousal (“excitement/depression”) and one for attention (“ten-
sion/relaxation”).
Osgood et al. (1957) used factor analysis on a large set of
affective ratings to derive three binary dimensions: “good/bad,”
“active/passive,” and “strong/weak.”
Tomkins (1962); Tomkins (1963) proposed eight basic emo-
tions (ignoring his non-lexicalized ninth emotion, dismell, or
reaction to a bad smell), defining the dimensions with two terms
each, the first for the milder version of the emotion and the sec-
ond for a stronger related emotion: “interest/excitement,” “enjoy-
ment/joy,” “surprise/startle,” “distress/anguish,” “fear/terror,”
“shame/humiliation,” “contempt/disgust,” and “anger/rage.”
Ekman et al. (1969) proposed seven basic emotions: happi-
ness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger, and disgust. Ekman (1999)
extended this list with an additional eleven terms: amusement,
contempt, contentment, embarrassment, excitement, guilt, pride,
relief, satisfaction, pleasure, and shame.
Plutchik (1980) derived eight primary emotions from con-
sideration of evolutionarily adaptive emotions relevant across
species: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, anticipation,
and joy.
Building on the four basic emotions (expectancy, rage, fear,
and panic) he had originally argued for in 1982, Panksepp (2005)
proposed that neural hard-wiring in themammalian brain under-
lay seven primary emotions: seeking, fear, rage, lust, care, panic,
and play.
Robinson et al. (2004) analysis of emotion focused on the
general emotional characteristics of arousal and valence. They
did not suggest a specific set of labels for basic emotions, so
we took the general focus of their analysis and created a set of
labels related to danger or the lack thereof, to arousal, and to
approach/avoidance behavior: approach, avoid, toward, away, to,
from, evaluate, arouse, danger, and safe.
Stevenson et al. (2007) extended the affective norms (valence
and arousal judgments) collected by Bradley and Lang (1999),
for five emotions dimensions that they considered to be cross-
culturally universal (following Ekman, 1993; Levenson, 2003):
happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, and anger.
Reizenzein (2009) proposed that most or all emotions could be
expressed as variants of just a few: happiness, unhappiness, hope,
fear, surprise, disappointment, and relief. Analysis of these emo-
tions depends in Reizenstein’s theoretical framework on desire
and aversion, so we also included these two terms.
Kassam et al. (2013) looked at the neural correlates of nine
basic emotions: anger, disgust, envy, fear, happiness, lust, sad-
ness, and shame. They also listed 18 related terms, of which
we added 17: angry, enraged, disgusted, envious, jealous, afraid,
frightened, happy, joyous, lustful, horny, proud, admirable, sad,
gloomy, ashamed, and embarrassed. Their term revulsed did not
appear in the HiDEx dictionary and was not included in our list.
APPENDIX 2
The 50 words estimated to be highest and lowest in imageabil-
ity, from a set of 29,018 words. Imageability ratings have been
normalized.
Frontiers in Psychology | Language Sciences December 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 991 | 12
Westbury et al. Automating imageability judgments
HIGH IMAGEABILITY zESTIMATE HIGH IMAGEABILITY zESTIMATE
fishing 3.56 engender −4.63
adventures 3.40 lot −4.26
trees 3.40 ethic −4.17
river 3.39 inflame −4.15
mediterranean 3.34 better −4.15
boats 3.34 incite −3.99
wooden 3.33 inspire −3.99
mountain 3.31 abominate −3.99
boat 3.30 imply −3.95
pink 3.25 sincere −3.87
beach 3.21 provoke −3.84
champagne 3.20 tenacity −3.74
decorated 3.19 rile −3.74
kitchen 3.17 honesty −3.71
springs 3.16 poise −3.68
restaurant 3.15 honest −3.63
girl 3.08 courage −3.62
chocolate 3.08 lack −3.60
lake 3.07 lacking −3.58
miniature 3.06 arouses −3.58
dog 3.06 toughness −3.57
tree 3.04 certainly −3.53
water 3.04 sense −3.52
restaurants 3.03 patience −3.52
yellow 3.02 tamp −3.50
spotted 3.01 intentioned −3.46
dancing 3.01 instil −3.44
rock 2.99 innate −3.37
purple 2.98 twinge −3.31
adventure 2.98 kind −3.29
gardens 2.97 alienate −3.29
sea 2.97 reflects −3.28
park 2.96 impressed −3.27
fish 2.95 teamwork −3.26
ocean 2.94 allay −3.26
trailer 2.94 galvanize −3.26
flowers 2.93 sincerity −3.26
daughter 2.92 elicit −3.24
monkey 2.91 wetly −3.24
band 2.90 solid −3.23
courtyard 2.90 lacks −3.22
turtle 2.90 understandable −3.22
candy 2.89 arousing −3.20
nearby 2.88 decisiveness −3.19
room 2.88 instincts −3.16
plastic 2.88 ineducable −3.15
queen 2.87 smirked −3.15
boulevard 2.87 pragmatism −3.15
golden 2.87 fostering −3.14
floating 2.87 aroused −3.14
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